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CHALLENGING THE INTERNATIONAL 
TREND: 
THE CASE FOR ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE INVENTORSHIP IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
 
By Ernest Fok* 
While international patent regimes have disallowed computers from being 
named as inventors on a patent, the U.S. patent regime has an opportunity to 
promote innovation and reshape the patent landscape by recognizing artificial 
intelligence (“AI”) systems as inventors for patent applications. The main benefit 
of this would be driven by computer algorithms that incorporate modern machine 
learning techniques to generate patentable subject matter while eliminating the 
need for humans in the invention process. This computer algorithm, which will be 
referred to in this paper as “inventing-AI,” would not be recognized as inventors 
by the United States Patent and Trademark Office because it only allows for 
natural persons to be inventors on a patent application. 
This paper argues that the U.S. patent regime is poised to tip the global 
balance between economic incentives and the cost of society by recognizing 
inventing-AI as inventors. This paper will explore the problems posed by the 
USPTO’s inventorship requirements, the technology behind inventing-AI and its 
creative capabilities, and the current state of AI inventorship among major 
international patent regimes. Later, it will address why AI inventorship makes 
sense for the U.S. despite the global trend against granting computers such rights. 
The U.S. is poised to promote the Constitutional goal of advancing “the progress 
of science and the useful arts” for the betterment of society. Lastly, the paper will 
briefly discuss some major challenges that would arise from recognizing inventing-
AI as inventors and a potential solution to mitigate those issues. 
 
* Ernest Fok is a JD Candidate (2021) at Santa Clara University School of Law. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
 Artificial intelligence (“AI”) can revolutionize “the nature of the innovation 
process and the organization of [research and development].”1 Currently, the 
discovery of productive new ideas remains constant despite a sharp climb in 
research investment, whether it is looking at drug discovery, semiconductor 
research, medical innovation, or efforts to improve crop yields.2 For example, 
human researchers have only explored a small snippet of the estimated billions of 
“potentially drug-like molecules” in existence.3 These chemists often make 
educated guesses as to a compound’s suitability for medicines, drawing upon their 
knowledge of molecular structures and chemical properties to synthesize and test 
the compound’s efficacy.4 Unfortunately, this often results in failure because 
finding that breakthrough molecule has become more difficult and costly as drug 
discovery has grown increasingly complex and saturated with data.5 Despite 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries investing significant amounts of 
money into research, the number of new drugs based on novel molecules has 
remained flat in the past decades.6  
 
 This dynamic is changing as modern AI reinvents what it means to innovate. 
Methods such as machine learning and deep artificial neural networks enable AI to 
recognize images, comprehend language, and explore new molecule 
combinations.7 It does so in ways that a human would not consider, such as when 
an AI defeated the best human players of the complex board game “Go” using 
“winning strategies that no human had thought to try.”8 When applying this to drug 
discovery, a deep learning AI trained on vast sets of experimental data and chemical 
knowledge “could come up with novel compounds that scientists [have] never 
imagined.”9 So why hasn’t AI revolutionized research, development, and 
innovation to efficiently make impactful, patentable discoveries?  
  
While these sophisticated AI systems can mimic human acts of intelligence 
and creativity, these computers are not recognized as inventors in patent 
applications worldwide.10 As recently as January 2020, the European Patent Office 
(“EPO”) denied inventorship to inventing-AI because public policy and practicality 
 
1 David Rotman, AI is Reinventing the Way We Invent, MIT Tech. Rev., March 1, 2019, at 60, 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612898/ai-is-reinventing-the-way-we-invent/. 
2  Id. 
3 Id. at 59. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 David Rotman, AI is Reinventing the Way We Invent, MIT Tech. Rev., March 1, 2019, at 62, 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612898/ai-is-reinventing-the-way-we-invent/. 
8 Id. at 61. 
9 Id.  
10 NOAM SHEMTOV, A STUDY ON INVENTORSHIP IN INVENTIONS INVOLVING AI ACTIVITY 35 
(2019).  
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considerations outweighed the benefits of recognizing AI systems as inventors.11 
The EPO also stated that “the understanding of the term inventor as referring to a 
natural person appears to be an internationally applicable standard.”12 Most patent 
jurisdictions continue to only recognize human inventorship, creating uncertainty 
and friction for those looking to use AI systems to automate the discovery and 
creation of patentable subject matter.13 By refusing to recognize AI systems as 
inventors, these patent regimes forgo promoting AI as a cost-efficient innovator in 
today’s society. 
 
 Though the international trend is to maintain the status quo, this paper will 
specifically look at why the U.S. patent system is well positioned to deviate from 
this international trend against non-human inventorship and recognize AI 
inventorship. The discussion is divided into two parts.  
 
Part I begins by describing U.S. inventorship requirements and the problem 
it poses for AI systems. The first requirement is that the patent application must 
name one or more inventors who must be “individuals,” which excludes non-human 
persons such as computers and corporations.14 The second requirement is that the 
inventor participates in the conception of an invention.15 Part I identifies and 
explains what types of AI systems can satisfy this requirement. Later on, Part I 
elaborates on how major international patent regimes are generally approaching AI 
inventorship and distinguishes why the U.S. patent system should recognize 
inventing-AI as inventors. 
 
Part II details how AI inventorship creates a better environment for 
innovation and patenting in the U.S. For instance, the U.S. patent system can gain 
a competitive edge by recognizing AI inventorship when other patent regimes have 
not. Furthermore, encouraging development and use of machines capable of 
independent invention can greatly reduce the cost of invention when combined with 
automation. Lastly, AI inventorship can shift behaviours in the patent marketplace 
towards behaviours like licensing and open sourcing that provide greater societal 
benefit. Extending inventorship to AI systems maximizes the economic and societal 
benefits that come with exclusive patent rights. This also comes with challenges 
related to patent ownership, which Part II will discuss in detail alongside a proposed 
statutory solution to this issue. Lastly, Part II concludes with how the U.S. patent 
system stands to positively shape the domestic and international patent landscape 
through AI inventorship. 
 
11 See EPO Publishes Grounds for its Decision to Refuse Two Patent Applications Naming a 
Machine as Inventor, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE (Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.epo.org/news-
events/news/2020/20200128.html. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2137.01 (9th ed. Rev. Jan. 2018) [hereinafter MPEP]. 
15 See Townsend v. Smith, 36 F.2d 292, 295 (C.C.P.A. 1929). 
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PART I 
I. THE PROBLEM WITH INVENTORSHIP 
To drastically change research and development, AI must be infused into 
each step of the inventive process. When human involvement can be minimized or 
eliminated through automation, inventing becomes faster and more cost efficient.16 
These inventions can then be patented, granting the inventor the right to exclude 
others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling or importing the invention.17 
This government-sanctioned monopoly provides a valuable incentive to innovate, 
but problems arise where AI obviates the need for humans in the creative process. 
 
Under the Patent Act, “whoever invents or discovers any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent.”18 Inventorship focuses on who invented 
the patent’s subject matter19, and the inventor who conceives of the invention does 
not need to reduce it to practice.20 It sets forth two main requirements. 
 
First, a patent application requires one or more inventors to be named,21 and 
these individuals then declare themselves as inventor(s) under oath.22 An individual 
cannot be a legal entity, such as a corporation.23 Secondly, the inventor(s) must 
have participated in the invention’s “conception,” which is defined as “the complete 
performance of the mental part of the inventive art.”24 This process includes making 
“non-obvious” discoveries.25 It also requires inventors to demonstrate an “inventive 
concept” beyond ineligible patent subjects.26 As a result, the inventor creates an 
innovation that meets the following conditions for patentability: useful, novel, and 
non-obvious.27  
 
 
16 See Rotman, supra note 1, at 63 (“To really change materials research, you need to attack the 
entire process: ‘What are the bottlenecks? You want AI in every piece of the lab’ . . . Machine 
learning could speed up each of those steps.”). 
17 35 U.S.C. § 154. 
18 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
19 MPEP § 2137.01 (9th ed. Rev. Jan. 2018) (“Unless a person contributes to the conception of 
the invention, he is not an inventor.”). 
20 Id. (Reduction to practice is satisfied when a patent application having a sufficient disclosure is 
filed or when the invention is actually carried out and is found to work for its intended purpose). 
21 Id. 
22 35 U.S.C. § 100(f). 
23 35 U.S.C. §§ 115-16. 
24 Townsend v. Smith, 36 F.2d 292, 295 (C.C.P.A. 1929). 
25 Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2016).  
26 Alice Corp. Party Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 271 (2014). 
27 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103. 
2021  Santa Clara Journal of International Law  19:1 
 
 56 
Thus, the main problem presented is whether “a computer autonomously 
conceiving of a patentable invention” can satisfy the patent application and “mental 
act” requirements.28 
 
II. THE NAMED INVENTOR(S) REQUIREMENT 
A. In Theory 
From a constitutional standpoint, a computer can be an inventor. The U.S. 
Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o promote the progress of science and 
useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right 
to their respective writings and discoveries,” leaving the term “inventor” open to 
interpretation.29 In 1973, the Supreme Court held that terms “authors” and 
“inventors” have “not been construed in their narrow literal sense but, rather, with 
the reach necessary to reflect the broad scope of constitutional principles,” 
suggesting that authors and inventors can be defined broadly to promote the 
progress of science and useful arts.30 In turn, both a literal and broad interpretation 
of the Constitution’s use of “inventor” suggests non-humans can be inventors.  
 
B. In Practice 
However, modern inventorship is limited to natural persons in practice. 
Current notions of conception are confined exclusively to natural persons because 
AI has no mind to complete the “mental act” required to invent or discover.31 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has more recently interpreted patent-eligible subject 
matter as “anything under the sun that is made by man,” suggesting only humans 
can generate inventions.32 Furthermore, the Dictionary Act provides that “[i]n 
determining the meaning of any Act of Congress . . . the [word] . . . 'individual,' 
shall include every infant member of the species homo sapiens.”33 Likewise, 
Congress has stated that corporations cannot be named as an inventor.34 Lastly, the 
Federal Circuit stated that “only natural persons may be ‘inventors’”35 and that 
“[p]eople conceive, not companies,” suggesting legal persons such as businesses 
are not capable of conception.36 Legal precedence so far only supports human 
inventorship. 
 
 
28 Ryan Abbott, I Think, Therefore I Invent: Creative Computers and Future of Patent Law, 57 
B.C. L. REV. 1079, 1096 (2016). 
29 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
30 Goldstein v. Cal., 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973). 
31 Daryl Lim, AI & IP: Innovation & Creativity in an Age of Accelerated Change, 52 AKRON L. 
REV. 813, 858 (2018). 
32 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (emphasis added). 
33 1 U.S.C. § 8(a). 
34 35 U.S.C. § 100(f). 
35 Beech Aircraft Corp. v. EDO Corp., 990 F.2d 1237, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (referring to 35 
U.S.C. §§ 115-118). 
36 New Idea Farm Equip. Corp. v. Sperry Corp., 916 F.2d 1561, 1566 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
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From an academic perspective, several scholars have emphasized that 
exclusive human inventorship is critical. One view is that inventorship is a moral 
right where inventors have a right to receive credit for their works.37 This is seen 
as complementary to the utilitarian view of patents as rewards for inventors that 
bravely “releas[e] intellectual property to the world.”38 It supports the social norm 
that drives inventors to patent.39 For example, the patent itself acts as a credential 
for the inventor to signal to society that the inventor of the patent is worthy of 
respect.40 These rights do not apply to artificial intelligence systems that lack 
consciousness and self-awareness.41 
 
III. THE “MENTAL ACT” REQUIREMENT  
Though modern AI does not possess volition, it is technologically capable 
of creativity and imagination to satisfy the “mental act” required for invention.42 
 
Human inventorship continues to dominate because computers have 
commonly been used as tools to assist human inventors to reduce an invention to 
practice, but are not often participating in the invention’s conception—a mandatory 
requirement for inventorship.43 With more recent AI developments, computers took 
on a more “substantive role” in the inventive process by automating data analysis 
or conducting pattern recognition, but may still fail to contribute to conception44 
because the computer is merely implementing statistical or mathematical concepts 
in a series of routine and ordinary tasks under Alice.45 However, AI has grown more 
sophisticated by moving from a simple program that executes a static algorithm 
implemented by a human programmer to a complex system utilizing artificial 
neural networks and machine learning that mimics the dynamic aspects of human 
 
37 Jason Rantenen & Sarah E. Jack, Patents as Credentials, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 311, 314 
(2019); see Czarnik v. Illumina, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 252, 256 (D. Del. 2006) (concluding that 
the plaintiff had standing to correct inventorship because “he ha[d] suffered harm to his 
reputation and standing in the scientific community”); see also Chou v. Univ. of Chi., 254 F.3d 
1347, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[B]eing considered an inventor of important subject matter is a 
mark of success in one's field . . . Pecuniary consequences may well flow from being designated 
as an inventor.”). 
38 Rantenen, supra note 37, at 316. 
39 Rantenen, supra note 37, at 315-16. 
40 Rantenen, supra note 37, at 316.  
41 Shemtov, supra note 10, at 35. 
42 See Abbott, supra note 28, at 1083. 
43 Abbott, supra note 28, at 1093. 
44 Abbott, supra note 28, at 1093. 
45 See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (2014) (The Court set forth a two-prong test for determining patent-
eligibility, in which the first step is determining whether the claims are directed to a patent-
ineligible concept, such as an abstract idea and, if so, the second step is considering “the elements 
of each claim both individually and as an ordered combination to determine whether the 
additional elements transform the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application”, in search 
for an “inventive concept.”) (internal quotation and citations omitted). 
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creativity.46 These techniques emulate the brain’s broad methods for processing 
information, but without human constraints such as the body’s limited energy 
output or skull size.47 They enable modern AI to learn and adapt to novel situations 
by using training data and learning algorithms to generate predictions beyond what 
it was originally programmed for,48 suggesting that the computers are operating in 
a non-routine, transformative manner to generate inventions that meets the patent 
subject matter eligibility requirements set forth in Mayo and Alice.49 Though 
humans are “necessarily involved in the creative process” whether its developing 
or using AI, there should be no reason for these humans to qualify as the inventor 
where the AI “autonomously develop[s] useful information” and “creates a 
patentable result in an area not foreseen” by its creator or user.50 These 
developments suggest that inventorship should be extended AI systems 
autonomously capable of independent invention. These systems, henceforth 
referred to as “inventing-AI,” are capable of the “mental act” required for 
inventorship in instances where no natural person has contributed to the invention’s 
conception. To understand how inventing-AI invents like humans do, it is important 
to briefly delve into the technology.  
 
IV. INVENTING AI 
Inventing-AI are artificial intelligence systems that can be categorized as 
“weak AI” or “strong AI” that are “capable of the same level of invention and 
creativity as any individual person.”51 As a result, these systems can perform the 
mental act required of inventors. 
 
Weak AI systems are designed to solve a narrowly tailored problem such as 
winning in well-defined board games or creating new toothbrush designs, whereas 
strong AI represents generalized intelligence akin to human mental capabilities 
such as reasoning and problem solving.”52 An example of this is IBM’s Watson, 
which utilizes logical deduction, statistical regression models, and massive 
databases of human knowledge and expertise to mimic human creativity in a wide 
variety of settings such as competing on complex human game shows like 
Jeopardy! or developing new food recipes.53  
 
 
46 Russ Pearlman, Recognizing Artificial Intelligence (AI) as Authors and Inventors Under U.S. 
Intellectual Property Law, 24 RICH. J. L. & TECH. 2, 37 (2018). 
47 Hal Hodson, DeepMind and Google: The Battle to Control Artificial Intelligence, THE 
ECONOMIST (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.1843magazine.com/features/deepmind-and-google-the-
battle-to-control-artificial-intelligence. 
48 Sikander Khan, Associate, Haynes, Beffel & Woldfeld LLP, Lecture at Santa Clara University 
School of Law (Oct. 30, 2019). 
49 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012). 
50 Abbott, supra note 28, at 1095. 
51 Pearlman, supra note 46, at 11. 
52 Pearlman, supra note 46, at 11; see also Abbott, supra note 28, at 1084-86. 
53 Abbott, supra note 28, at 1090-91. 
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Whether classified as weak or strong AI, inventing-AI utilizes machine 
learning which “involves building and adapting [computational] models” that 
“teach computers how to learn and act without being explicitly programmed.”54 
Artificial neural networks are an example of one type of machine learning model. 
These neural networks are digital embodiments that simulate the human brain’s 
“fundamental mechanisms responsible for idea formation,” thus enabling the 
system to generate novel patterns of information and adapt to new scenarios without 
additional human input.55 The AI’s software adaptations are not coded by human 
beings. Instead, the AI undergoes a self-assembling process by modifying how its 
artificial neural networks communicate with each other as the system encounters 
input data,56 much like how the human brain’s neurons communicate with each 
other to understand and adapt to inputs from human senses.57 There are also several 
other machine learning algorithms that are “not modeled after the human brain or 
evolutionary processes” but still enable inventing-AI to generalize information and 
knowledge in ways that even human experts have difficulty achieving.58 Given 
these technological developments, inventing-AI can perform the mental acts 
required for human inventorship. 
 
In fact, this has been indirectly recognized by the U.S. Patent Office 
(“USPTO”). In 2005, Dr. John Koza was awarded the patent on an invention 
created by an inventing-AI known as the “invention machine,” which utilized 
genetic programming (modeled after evolutionary processes) to create an 
improvement to a known controller system without the aid of a “database of expert 
knowledge” and “without knowledge about existing controllers.”59 The prosecution 
history did not mention the use of AI to develop the invention, and the patent was 
issued to Dr. Koza despite Koza’s admission that “his legal counsel advised . . . that 
[Koza’s] team consider themselves inventors” even though “the whole invention 
was created by a computer.”60 Despite this admission, the USPTO “seem[ed] to 
require only that a natural person be registered for the patent” and upheld the patent 
because the application “[met] its other stringent requirements.”61 In this instance, 
the patent application listed a human inventor who did not take part in conception. 
This example illustrates that an AI system can conceive an invention satisfying 
inventorship and substantive patent requirements in the U.S.   
 
54 DeepAI, What is Machine Learning?, https://deepai.org/machine-learning-glossary-and-
terms/machine-learning (last visited Dec. 13, 2020). 
55 Abbott, supra note 28, at 1084-85. 
56 Abbott, supra note 28, at 1084-85. 
57 DeepAI, supra note 54. 
58 Abbott, supra note 28, at 1088-89. 
59 Abbott, supra note 28, at 1087; U.S. Patent No. 6,847,851 (filed July 12, 2002) (issued Jan. 25, 
2005) (listing Dr. John Koza as the inventor for an AI-generated invention that involved no 
human intervention; AI’s involvement not disclosed to Patent Office). 
60 Abbott, supra note 28, at 1088. 
61 Pearlman, supra note 46, at 23. 
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Where inventing-AI generated patentable subject matter and met the 
substantive novelty, non-obvious, and useful requirements, the U.S. patent regime 
has indirectly, though not officially, recognized AI inventorship. 
 
V. THE CURRENT STATE OF AI INVENTORSHIP  
To better contextualize what the U.S. patent system can gain from 
recognizing AI inventorship, it is important to understand how other major patent 
regimes are approaching this topic. 
 
A. Global Trend 
As reported in a recently commissioned 2019 study by the EPO broadly 
discussing AI inventorship across prominent patent regimes, none of the major 
patent jurisdictions (U.S., China, Japan, Republic of Korea, European Union) allow 
for AI systems to be inventors.62 Notably, each jurisdiction differed in its 
terminology and tests to define an inventor but maintained an overall uniform 
objective: “to identify the person that was responsible, wholly or partially, for what 
may be described as the intelligent and creative conception of the invention.”63 
Delving further, the study detailed the EPO’s “strict definition of inventorship 
limited to humans” and why this policy is “suitable for the legal and technological 
landscape both at present and in the near future.” 64 The study emphasizes three 
main rationales for the EPO’s approach and generalizes them to explain why 
recognizing AI inventorship is unnecessary for other patent regimes. 
 
First, extending inventorship beyond natural persons would have largely 
negative consequences.65 For instance, the European Patent Convention’s (“EPC”) 
framework safeguards the inventor’s right of entitlement and right of attribution 
under EPC Article 60.66 These rights are valued by human inventors, but would be 
meaningless when applied to an AI system.67 These rights provide value to human 
inventors. The two main functions relate to personhood interests: (1) creating a 
pecuniary incentive to invent and (2) increasing reputational gain.68  Granting such 
rights would entail granting personhood to the inventing-AI, but the ensuing legal 
hurdles make these solutions a mere gesture at best and very impractical at worst.69 
For example, concepts of ownership and employment cannot be successfully 
applied to AI systems under the EPO’s legal framework since AI systems cannot 
own property nor can they be a party to employment relationship.70 Thus, there are 
 
62 Shemtov, supra note 10, at 5. 
63 Shemtov, supra note 10, at 5. 
64 Shemtov, supra note 10, at 34. 
65 Shemtov, supra note 10, at 8. 
66 Shemtov, supra note 10, at 25. 
67 Shemtov, supra note 10, at 24-25. 
68 Shemtov, supra note 10, at 23 (citing Jeanne Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual 
Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745 (2012)). 
69 Shemtov, supra note 10, at 27. 
70 Shemtov, supra note 10, at 6. 
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no “convincing rationales” to apply the EPC rules on attribution and entitlement to 
an AI system.71 In applying this to the present legal landscape, other major patent 
regimes are “not equipped to facilitate a definition of inventorship that includes AI 
systems” because inventorship involves concepts of ownership, employment, and 
entitlement that are meaningless to AI systems.72 
 
Second, the study anticipates AI inventorship being unwarranted even if the 
technology advances so significantly that the process of invention would be so 
removed from human involvement that no human actor could be considered an 
inventor.73 It found that patents with substantial AI involvement are still likely to 
be granted even without the recognition of computers as inventors as long as human 
inventors can be identified.74 For instance, EPO policy dictates that the person who 
recognizes the importance and utility of the invention is also an inventor.75 This 
approach is shared by “all of the relevant patent jurisdictions grant patents where 
the inventor comes by the core of the inventive concept . . . by dumb luck rather 
than real inventive effort.”76 When applying this to inventing-AI, the person who 
selects the machine learning algorithms, chooses the relevant parameters, or 
identifies the input data could be an inventor even if the inventing-AI’s output was 
somewhat unpredictable. Since AI systems involve many actors—such as 
programmers, users, and investors—identifying who is an inventor should be 
carried out on a case-by-case basis.77 The study recommends that other patent 
regimes would benefit from approaching inventions that involve AI activity in a 
similar manner because it would establish a uniform position towards 
inventorship.78 
 
In sum, the report concludes that the “present legal landscape” for major 
patent regimes is “not equipped to facilitate a definition of inventorship that 
includes AI systems.”79 The legal arguments against AI inventorship expressed in 
the EPO’s study are applicable to the U.S. patent regime. However, the U.S. patent 
regime could embrace AI inventorship to shift the patent landscape and capitalize 
on the growing investment in AI technologies. 
 
 
71 Shemtov, supra note 10, at 34. 
72 Shemtov, supra note 10, at 35. 
73 Shemtov, supra note 10, at 34. 
74 Shemtov, supra note 10, at 24. 
75 Shemtov, supra note 10, at 21 (“Whether encountering the inventive concept of the invention 
by pure luck and realizing its utility and significance or whether by doing so after examining the 
output of an AI system, the relevant person may be considered as the inventor and their 
involvement may be described as intellectual or creative conception.”). 
76 Shemtov, supra note 10, at 35. 
77 Shemtov, supra note 10, at 31. 
78 Shemtov, supra note 10, at 35. 
79 Shemtov, supra note 10, at 35. 
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B. United States 
First, the Patent Act requires that an inventor be listed on a patent 
application.80 Listing a natural person who did not participate in conceiving of an 
inventing-AI’s invention may give rise inequitable conduct.81 This also applies to 
patent applicants who intentionally falsify inventorship to the USPTO on any 
issued patent.82 In this instance, the inventing-AI’s programmer or end-user would 
not be classified as a joint inventor. Humans can provide machines with a task and 
materials needed to invent, but this does not make her an inventor. Inventorship 
requires contributing to the conception of the invention, and inventors may adopt 
ideas, suggestions, and materials from others as long as they maintain intellectual 
dominion over making the invention.83 Similarly, a programmer or user who directs 
the inventing-AI to generate inventions within a given domain may not qualify as 
a co-inventor.84 Patentees seeking to enforce their rights might have their suits 
dismissed for non-joinder if a court determines that the patent does not name all 
joint inventors.85 In light of this, there appears to be no case law or controversies 
related to non-human inventors, so it is likely that an AI would not qualify as a sole 
inventor, let alone as a joint inventor.86  
 
Despite these hurdles, inventorship over the inventing-AI’s invention is 
possible because a person may qualify as an inventor by being the first individual 
to recognize and appreciate an existing invention.87 Under this circumstance, a 
person discovers rather than creates an invention. It follows that the person’s 
understanding of the invention’s importance would qualify the person as an 
inventor.88 This suggests any inventing-AI’s inventions are only patentable when 
an individual subsequently discovers them.89 While this is a solution, it raises a 
 
80 35 U.S.C § 111(a). 
81 35 U.S.C. § 101 (“Whoever invents or discovers . . . may obtain a patent thereof, subject to the 
conditions and requirements of this title.”); 35 U.S.C. § 115(a) (“An application for patent . . . 
shall include, or be amended to include, the name of the inventor for any invention claimed in the 
application.”). 
82 MPEP § 2137.01 (2018) (USPTO patent examination procedure for inventorship; states 
incorrectly identifying inventor on patent application is grounds for rejection). 
83 Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (A person who does not contribute to the 
conception of an invention is not an inventor. Reduction to practice is per se irrelevant for 
inventorship, except for simultaneous conception and reduction to practice.). 
84 Ex parte Smernoff, 215 U.S.P.Q. 545, 547 (Bd. App. 1982) (“[O]ne who suggests an idea of a 
result to be accomplished, rather than the means of accomplishing it, is not a[] coinventor.”). 
85 Lim, supra note 31, at 860. 
86 Pearlman, supra note 46, at 24. 
87 Abbott, supra note 28, at 1098. 
88 See Silvestri v. Grant, 496 F.2d 593, 597 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (“[A]n accidental and unappreciated 
duplication of an invention does not defeat the patent right of one who, though later in time, was 
the first to recognize that which constitutes the inventive subject matter.”). 
89 Abbott, supra note 28, at 1098. 
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challenging question of who should be listed as the inventor—should it be the AI 
programmer, the end-user, the person providing the training data, or the AI creator? 
Allowing AI inventorship may shift this analysis to a more efficient point in the 
patenting timeline. 
 
Second, though the EPO-commissioned study suggests that inventing-AI is 
still in its infancy such that its inventive processes can always be attributable human 
involvement, the USPTO has already unknowingly granted patents for inventions 
created by inventing-AI.90  
 
Third, the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o promote the 
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and 
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries, leaving 
the term “inventor” open to interpretation.91 In August 2019, the USPTO requested 
comments on patent-related issues regarding AI inventions to decide how to 
interpret “inventor.”92 This question was decided in April 2020, when the USPTO 
issued a final decision93 concerning two recent patent applications simultaneously 
filed with the USPTO and EPO that listed an inventing-AI as the inventor: one for 
an improved beverage container, the other for a light-emitting device used in 
search-and-rescue missions.94 The EPO refused these two patent applications in 
November 2019, stating that the European patent framework requires an inventor 
designated in a European patent to be natural person.95  The U.S. came to a similar 
conclusion in April 2020, relying on “current statutes, case law, and USPTO 
regulations and rules” to “limit inventorship to natural persons.”96 
PART II 
I. CONSIDERING AI INVENTORSHIP IN THE U.S. 
AI inventorship has not been recognized in the U.S. despite a dramatic 
increase in the development and use of AI technologies. In 2017, an economic study 
showed that 550 start-ups using AI as a core part of their products raised $5 billion 
 
90 Abbott, supra note 28, at 1099. 
91 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
92 Request for Comments on Patenting AI Inventions, 84 Fed. Reg. 44, 889 (Aug. 22, 2019). 
93 FlashPoint, 2020 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 16/524,350. 
94 When Innovation Invents: Artificial Intelligence Issues at the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office, JONES DAY (Aug. 2019), https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2019/09/when-
innovation-invents; see also Patent Applications, THE ARTIFICIAL INVENTOR PROJECT, 
http://artificialinventor.com/patent-applications/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2019) (listing patent 
specifications for two inventions independently created by AI system named “DABUS”). 
95 EPO, supra note 11 (“[T]he applications EP17275163 and EP18275174 were refused by the 
EPO . . . on grounds that they do not meet the legal requirement of the [EPC] that an inventor 
designated in the application has to be a human being, and not a machine.”). 
96 FlashPoint, supra note 93. 
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in funding with 60% of that funding going into American companies.97 Moreover, 
the American Intellectual Property Law Association estimated the annual 
investments directly in AI technologies in 2017 reached $26-39 billion.98 Alongside 
this investment, the employment market for deep learning researchers has boomed 
with some researchers obtained through mergers and acquisitions being valued at 
nearly $10 million.99 AI commercialization is expected to reach $190 billion by 
2025.100 
 
While investment in AI has dramatically increased, the USPTO has not been 
receiving a similar increase in applications claiming computers as the inventor.101 
This suggests that applicants are choosing not to disclose the AI in the inventive 
process.102 This trend of obscuring AI involvement in the inventive process 
highlights the legal risks of listing a non-human inventor. While the practice of 
listing humans who utilize inventing-AI has worked for the U.S. system so far, it 
fails to further incentivize the use of inventing-AI.103 For example, corporations, 
research institutions, and investors may be dissuaded from using inventing-AI to 
fully automate innovation because it amplifies the uncertainty and administrative 
burden of obtaining a patent on the resulting invention. By requiring a natural 
person to be listed as an inventor, the U.S. unnecessarily maintains a cost-inefficient 
status quo. Should the U.S. recognize AI inventorship, it could drastically change 
industries whose R&D costs have been ballooning just to maintain historical rates 
of useful, patentable discoveries.104 AI inventorship is a critical step in unlocking 
inventing-AI’s potential to promote innovation within the patent landscape. Several 
reasons supporting AI inventorship are discussed below. 
II. SUPPORTING THE ECONOMIC-UTILITARIAN RATIONALE 
The rationale for AI inventorship is strongest under a utilitarian-economic 
incentive theory (“UEI”) because the Constitution provides “explicit rationale” for 
granting patent protection to encourage innovation.105 Inventorship and the 
subsequent patent ownership rights are necessary to economically incentivize 
 
97 The 2016 AI Recap: Startups See Record High in Deals and Funding, CB INSIGHTS (Jan. 19, 
2017), https://www.cbinsights.com/research/artificial-intelligence-startup-funding/. 
98 Aaron Abood, Deep Learning – A Practical Perspective for Patent Practitioners, AM. INTELL. 
PROP. L. ASSOC. (2017). 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Abbott, supra note 28, at 1080 n.5 (citing Ben Hattenbach & Joshua Glucoft, Patents in an 
Era of Infinite Monkeys and Artificial Intelligence, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 32, 44 & n.70 (2015) 
(Abbott noted no pertinent results from “a search for patent cases discussing genetic 
programming or computer-aided drug discovery (perhaps the two most common means of 
computerized inventive activity)” and that “[o]f a sampling of issued patents that were conceived 
wholly or in part by computers, none have ever been subject to litigation.”).  
102 Abbott, supra note 28, at 1080.  
103 Abbott, supra note 28, at 1080. 
104 See Introduction. 
105 Abbott, supra note 28, at 1098. 
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investment in innovation, but this must be balanced against the social cost of 
granting a government-sanctioned monopoly that can limit the diffusion of 
knowledge.106 This balancing is necessary to achieve the ultimate goal of advancing 
public welfare.107  
A. Competitive Advantage in Innovation 
First, allowing AI inventorship may put the U.S. patent regime at a 
competitive advantage relative to its peers.  
 
In the past, the U.S. patent system gained a competitive advantage by 
allowing man-made organisms to be patentable subject matter.108 Similarly, 
allowing for AI inventorship could spur the use and development of inventing-AI. 
To illustrate this, the USPTO allowed the first transgenic animal, the “Harvard 
Mouse,” to be patented in the wake of Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 47 U.S. 303 
(1980), which allowed man-made organisms to be patentable subject matter.109 
Biotechnology patents post-Chakrabarty were focused on whether the invention 
constituted patentable subject matter, rather than the morality of the invention.110 
The USPTO left the ethical questions to the legislature and executive branches.111 
The same “Harvard Mouse” patent was submitted to the EPO, but was contested 
under EPC Article 53 due to ethical concerns.112 This required the EPO Examining 
Division “to weigh the suffering of animals and possible risks to the environment 
on the one hand, and the invention's usefulness to mankind on the other.”113 While 
the EPO ultimately granted the patent, the codified moral utility requirement 
opened grounds for litigation and invalidation within the EPC. The EPC’s lack of 
legal certainty and potentially disparate applications of the moral utility doctrine 
placed the European patent system at a relative disadvantage to the US patent 
system.114 
 
AI inventorship could give the U.S. patent system a similar innovative edge. 
Where other regimes hesitate to expand inventorship to inventing-AI, the USPTO 
could challenge the status quo. Just as it had deferred judgments of morality 
regarding man-made organisms, the USPTO can similarly discount mental acts as 
an exclusively human capability. Doing so could focus patent law on the “nature of 
 
106 Peter S. Menell, et al., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE: 2019, 
VOLUME I: PERSPECTIVES, TRADE SECRETS AND PATENTS 27 (2019). 
107 Melzer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). 
108 Benjamin Enerson, Protecting Society from Patently Offensive Inventions: The Risk of 
Reviving the Moral Utility Doctrine, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 685, 694-95 (2004). 
109 U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (issued Apr. 12, 1988). 
110 Enerson, supra note 108, at 696-98. 
111 Enerson, supra note 108, at 696-98; see Juicy Whip Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 
1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (refusing to apply the moral utility doctrine to an invention designed to fool 
the public).  
112 Enerson, supra note 108, at 698. 
113 Enerson, supra note 108, at 698 (internal quotations omitted). 
114 Enerson, supra note 108, at 714. 
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the invention itself rather than the subjective mental processes by which an 
invention may have been achieved.”115 
 
Allowing AI inventorship would remove the legal uncertainty surrounding 
the validity of inventing-AI created patents, thus incentivizing an underutilized 
avenue to generate innovative patents. For example, the USPTO has seen increases 
in recent years in the number of first and second AI-related patent filings due to the 
large community of AI inventors in the U.S.116 and allowing for AI inventorship 
could further fuel this trend. 
B. Economic Efficiency 
AI inventorship may also increase economic efficiency by lowering the 
time, effort, and resources needed to innovate. This is an extension of how AI and 
automation represents the next “industrial revolution.”117 
 
First, formally requiring patent applications to list a human inventor adds 
friction to the patenting process. AI inventorship removes the need for a human 
inventor, potentially lowering the human capital needed to generate novel 
inventions. Like most automation, inventing-AI is not bound by human limitations 
and can discover patterns and improvements by considering a greater range of prior 
art that may extend beyond the typical skilled inventor. With further development, 
inventing-AI systems can obviate the need for human input and can create 
patentable subject matter on an economically-scalable level. 
 
Secondly, AI inventorship could shift the process of negotiating and 
assigning rights to the inventing-AI’s invention.118 Currently, an inventing-AI’s 
invention can only be patented if a human took part in the otherwise autonomous, 
independent conception process or discovered the invention’s importance.119 This 
raises questions about which natural person is the inventor and who subsequently 
owns the patent rights. This is challenging since AI inventions often involve 
“numerous actors, both overlapping and independent, encompassing software 
programmers, data and feedback suppliers, trainers, system owners and operators, 
employers, the public and the government.”120 Furthermore, the decision on who 
should be listed as the inventor can be challenging when approximately 93% of 
patents are assigned to organizations rather than individuals.121 Mechanisms for 
transfer include employment and work-for-hire agreements, but not all actors 
 
115 Abbott, supra note 28, at 1098. 
116 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WIPO TECHNOLOGY TRENDS 2019: ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE 83-84 (2019).  
117 WORLD ECON. FORUM, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE COLLIDES WITH PATENT LAW 5 (2018). 
118 Shemtov, supra note 10, at 30. 
119 See Part I § V(B); see also FlashPoint, supra note 93, at 6. 
120 Shemtov, supra note 10, at 30. 
121 Abbott, supra note 28, at 1092 n.101. 
2021  Challenging the International Trend  19:1 
 
67 
involved with the use and development of an inventing-AI may be bound to such 
contracts. 
 
UEI theory dictates that society is be best served by allocating patent rights 
to the party that can maximize economic efficiency. Economic efficiency is 
optimized when the party that most values the patent also owns the patent rights, 
though this varies depending on the party and its respective industry.122 Given that 
economic efficiency is a case-by-case analysis, allowing inventorship rights (and 
subsequent ownership rights that flow from inventorship) to vest in an inventing-
AI would encourage interested parties to contract or negotiate for transfer of those 
rights retrospectively rather than prospectively. Ideally, the party that most values 
the patent will be the highest bidder capable of commercializing the AI-produced 
invention.123 
 
This can plausibly extend to real world scenarios where a third party designs 
an inventing-AI, such as IBM’s Watson, to be distributed for use by other parties.124 
These parties could use an instance of Watson on their own hardware, which could 
then be trained and adapted to invent within the desired parameters of a given 
industry. In this hypothetical, it would be unclear who would claim rights to 
Watson’s invention or how that dispute could be resolved in efficient manner. AI 
inventorship create possibilities to leverage existing frameworks such as work-for-
hire and employment agreements to increase economic efficiency.  
 
Lastly, AI inventorship can make inventing-AI economically viable for 
companies by reducing the cost to obtain patent rights while ensuring more 
knowledge is made publicly available. With less money spent on research and 
development, the market monopoly that comes with patent rights becomes more 
valuable over other options such as trade secret protection which limits public 
disclosure and dissemination of knowledge.125 Such an economic incentive could 
rapidly increase patent filings and subsequently enrich society’s access to new 
knowledge. Moreover, the U.S. could draw international companies and investors 
to capitalize on an innovation-friendly patent system. If successful, it could 
incentivize other patent regimes to follow suit given the U.S.’s dominant position 
in AI technologies. Increasing patent filings expands the pool of knowledge from 
which inventors can draw from, thus further accelerating societal and scientific 
progress already being made by AI technology.  
C. Increased Patent Value for Practicing Entities 
AI inventorship could also shift the value of patents in the marketplace by 
enhancing patent value for practicing entities relative to patent assertion entities.  
 
122 W. Michael Schuster, Artificial Intelligence and Patent Ownership, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1945, 1950 (2018). 
123 Id. at 1986. 
124 Abbott, supra note 28, at 1115. 
125 Abbott, supra note 28, at 1104. 
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The complex patent ecosystem consists of two major entities: practicing 
entities (“PE”) and patent-assertion entities (“PAE”).126 PEs are commonly 
companies that practice their inventions and  use patents to maximize their freedom 
to operate.127 In contrast, PAEs are “entities [] focused on the enforcement, rather 
than the active development or commercialization of their patents” and can be 
further divided into several types such as “large-portfolio companies, small-
portfolio companies, and individuals.”128 
 
Both entities employ two board patent strategies to achieve operating 
freedom and profitability: a defensive “arm race” strategy and an offensive 
“marketplace” strategy.129 The “arms race” strategy involves developing or 
purchasing a high quantity of patents with less attention paid to quality.130 The 
objective is to build a patent arsenal to defend against the risk of patent litigation, 
neutralize lawsuit threats by competitors, and leverage the patent portfolios to 
promote cross-licensing while establishing market presence and revenue 
streams.131 PEs often adopt a “marketplace” strategy to quickly adapt their patent 
portfolios to protect against litigation. Conversely, the “arms race” strategy 
involves offensively asserting large patent portfolios that were initially developed 
for defensive purposes.132 This includes generating profit through licensing or 
organizing company subsidiaries to sue companies in technology areas where the 
patent owner does not practice.133 PAEs frequently employ an “arms race” strategy 
to use their patent portfolio to offensively to sue or threaten to sue practicing 
companies.134  
 
The interplay between PEs and PAEs leads to both entities swinging 
between “arms race” and “marketplace” strategies, which increases the social cost 
associated with patent rights by (1) lowering patent quality while (2) increasing the 
ability of PAEs to hold-up practicing companies from exercising their patent 
rights.135 Defensive patenting results in fewer lawsuits, but also has a negative 
effect of increasing the number of low-quality and unused patents that can lead to 
patent-hold up.136 
 
 
126 Colleen Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and its 
Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L. J. 297, 298 (2010). 
127 Id. at 320. 
128 Id. at 328. 
129 See id. at 320. 
130 See id. at 321. 
131 Colleen Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and its 
Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L. J. 297, 299 (2010). 
132 Id. at 321. 
133 Id. at 342. 
134 Id. at 344. 
135 Id. at 344. 
136 Id. at 336 (Defensive patenting motives “drive the accumulation of large numbers of low-cost 
patents.”). 
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In theory, AI inventorship could lower the social cost associated with patent 
rights by financially incentivizing companies to employ inventing-AI to create high 
quality patents over buying them in the patent marketplace. AI inventorship can 
promote inventing-AI as a cost-efficient alternative method to amass patents, 
potentially eliminating the need to purchase patents as part of the “arms race.” 
Moreover, companies may be less likely to dispose of their patents in the patent 
marketplace for lack of strategy value or use. Conversely, smaller PEs can use 
inventing-AI to compete with industry giants by first building their own portfolio 
with lower time and money investments then later generating capital through 
licensing. Both approaches could reduce low quality patents in the marketplace, 
effectively limiting an avenue for PAEs to acquire patents for litigating purposes. 
AI inventorship could shift the patent ecosystem to favor PEs.137 This can enable 
them to innovate faster and with more precision within their industry. Public 
welfare benefits when PEs amass more higher quality patents because they gain 
greater freedom to operate at lower cost while enriching the patent pool.  
 
Other benefits include engaging in positive cross-licensing or open-source 
activity with greater speed and efficiency. For example, the semiconductor industry 
benefited when Cisco amassed a large patent portfolio and cross-licensed it to 
competitors, which prevented those competitors from blocking Cisco products 
while generating royalties.138 Similarly, Sun Microsystems shared its patent 
portfolio to support open-source development. By placing its patents into the public 
domain, Sun not only capitalized by creating the industry standard in a new field, 
but also provided developers with the knowledge and freedom to innovate or create 
derivative works from its platform.139 Beyond these activities, patents may also be 
assigned or sold while retaining the right to sell the patent and sue for infringement, 
which can also keep the patent off the market and further limit PAE activity.140 
 
AI inventorship could more greatly benefit PEs over PAEs in the patent 
ecosystem, encouraging more socially beneficial patent practices and behaviors 
over innovation-hindering litigation and hold-ups. 
PART III 
I. CHALLENGES WITH TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP 
Currently, U.S. patent law grants ownership rights to the inventor absent an 
assignment. Intellectual property is an alienable personal property right which can 
 
137 Schuster, supra note 122, at 1996 (“Societal costs associated with patent troll litigation are 
substantial. Activity of this nature cannot proceed, however, unless trolls are able to purchase 
patents.”). 
138 Chien, supra note 126, at 321. 
139 Chien, supra note 126, at 321. 
140 See Schuster, supra note 122, at 1997.   
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be transferred, assigned, licensed, or sold.141 For patents, initial ownership is vested 
in: (1) the inventor(s) of the patent; (2) an employer via pre-inventive assignments; 
or (3) an employer for an employee who was “employed to invent.”142 While 
ownership may be assigned to the natural person inventor, it may also be assigned 
to non-natural persons such as a corporation via work-for-hire or assignment 
contracts.143 
 
In the absence of an assignment, the original applicant is presumed to be the 
owner.144 Where a patent has multiple owners, each owner may exploit the patent 
without the consent of the others.145 The owners of a patent gain the “right to 
exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention 
throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United States.”146 
Where there is only one inventor, and the inventor has not assigned the patent 
property, the inventor owns the entire right, title, and interest of the patent 
property.147 Thus, if inventing-AI is recognized as an inventor, it would not be able 
to own the patent rights to the invention absent an assignment.  
 
One solution is extending personhood to include inventing-AI, enabling the 
system to own property rights like natural and legal persons.  
 
Several countries have suggested or attempted this approach, but with 
limited success. For example, the European Union (“EU”) parliament proposed the 
possibility of establishing electronic personhood, but ultimately found this 
approach unwarranted given the current state of AI and largely narrow capabilities 
of most AI systems.148 Similarly, residency and citizenship were granted to AI 
robots in Japan and Saudi Arabia, respectively. However, these were mere “public 
relation exercises” to support initiatives by the local government. The rights arising 
from these statuses were not elaborated on.149 In practice, Estonia made the most 
stride in recognizing electronic personhood within a limited tort liability context so 
that citizens could understand who is liable when autonomous vehicles case 
 
141 Thomas G. Field, Jr., IP Basics: Managing Intellectual Property, Univ. N.H., Franklin Pierce 
Ctr. For Intell. Prop. 1 (2015) (“IP is intangible, but the parallels to tangible property are many. 
Everything accurately called ‘property’ represents alienable, divisible and legally enforceable 
rights.”); see MPEP § 301 (2018) (patents under 35 U.S.C. are assigned attributes of personal 
property). 
142 37 C.F.R. § 3.73 (2018) (inventor is presumed to be the owner of a patent application unless 
there is an assignment). 
143 Pearlman, supra note 46, at 21. 
144 37 C.F.R. § 1.42 (2018) (referring to the "applicant" as the inventor). 
145 MPEP § 2137.01 (2018). 
146 35 U.S.C. § 154. 
147 MPEP § 301 (2018). 
148 See Shemtov, supra note 10, at 25; see Open Letter to the European Commission, Artificial 
Intelligence and Robotics, http://www.robotics-openletter.eu (last visited Dec. 13, 2020) 
(challenging proposal by the European Parliament to grant electronic personhood to “smart 
robots”). 
149 Shemtov, supra note 10, at 26-27.  
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accidents or malfunction.150 However, it is unclear whether the Estonian 
government will pass more legislation to broaden these rights to parallel those of 
natural persons.151 In these examples, the legal burden associated with granting 
personhood to inventing-AI would outweigh its potential economic and societal 
benefits. 
 
However, the Patent Act has a statutory provision which could be 
effectively transfer ownership rights. Rather than granting personhood, the USPTO 
could recognize inventing-AI as a deceased or legally incapacitated inventor under 
35 U.S.C. § 409. Under this statute, a legal representative for a deceased or legally 
incapacitated inventor can file a patent application on the inventor’s behalf.152 
Moreover, the representative can file a statement in lieu of an inventor’s oath or 
declaration.153 Most importantly, the statute allows for the patent to be issued to the 
legal representative under certain circumstances.154  
 
While this seems like a cumbersome workaround, the statute provides a pre-
existing framework from which the USPTO can utilize and adapt. It also creates a 
solution to the portability of inventing-AI. Inventing-AI can be implemented on a 
variety of systems depending on the user’s need, much like how IBM’s Watson is 
available to numerous developers and users while Watson remains under IBM’s 
ownership.155 The legally incapacitated inventor framework creates an opportunity 
for parties involved with the inventing-AI to negotiate and contract for who will 
represent the inventing-AI on a patent application for a given invention. Drawing 
upon the UEI theory, the ideal legal representative for the inventing-AI would have 
the highest economic interest in the invention. The USPTO could reduce friction in 
this process by looking to U.S. copyright work-for-hire practices under 17 U.S.C. 
§ 101 and enacting a similar provision for patents created by inventing-AI.  
 
II. CHALLENGES WITH THE “PERSON HAVING ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART” 
STANDARD 
 
If inventing-AI becomes more prevalent as a result of AI inventorship, the 
element of novelty, non-obviousness, and enablement may become an issue. These 
elements are judged according to a person of ordinary skill in the art, who is a 
hypothetical person presumed to have known the relevant art at the time of the 
invention.156 With AI’s ability to sort, store, and access vast quantities of 
knowledge beyond what human capabilities, the hypothetical skilled person may 
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become a person equipped with an AI system.157 Elevating the “person having 
ordinary skill in the art” (“PHOSITA”) standard could greatly affect established 
areas of patent law that rely on this standard, including novelty, obviousness, and 
enablement.158 As a result, patenting could become more difficult because of the 
elevated standard, thus constricting the ability for human inventors to secure 
patents.  
This issue is relevant whether AI inventorship is adopted or not given the 
dramatic investment in AI technology.159 While, AI inventorship may accelerate 
the pace at which this change is occurring, allowing inventing-AI could encourage 
more AI disclosure on patent applications. This gives the USPTO and other patent-
review agencies an opportunity to factor in the use of AI when using the PHOSITA 
standard. 
 
III. OTHER CONSEQUENCES 
Aside from legal hurdles, scholars have noted that AI inventorship could 
result in potential negative consequences. First, inventing-AI could result in a 
dramatic consolidation of intellectual property by large corporations, as these 
businesses are the ones most likely to have the resources to develop, maintain, and 
deploy these systems.160 Secondly, AI inventorship could lead to such a rapid 
proliferation of patents that companies may be rationally incentivized “to sell the 
patent for any non-zero sum” on the marketplace, resulting in PAEs having more 
access to inexpensive patents to assert against PEs.161 These consequences are 
merely possibilities, and they would need to be explored in more detail if AI 
inventorship becomes a reality.  
CONCLUSION 
The U.S. patent system has the potential to strongly benefit from 
recognizing inventing-AI as inventors. It would enable the U.S. patent regime to 
develop a competitive edge among its peers, encourage investment and use of 
inventing-AI, and shift the patent value towards PEs to encourage behavior that 
maximizes the social utility of patents. Though the challenges and potential 
negative consequences casts a shadow on whether AI inventorship is the best 
avenue to promote the Constitutional purpose behind patent rights, the U.S. may 
not have a similar prime opportunity to capitalize on a technology that will continue 
to see growth and controversy in the patent space. 
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